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Abstract—Over the past years, distributed energy resources
(DER) have been the object of many studies, which recognise
and establish their emerging role in the future of power systems.
However, the implementation of many scenarios and mechanism
are still challenging. This paper provides an overview of a local
energy market and explores the approaches in which consumers
and prosumers take part in this market. Therefore, the purpose of
this paper is to review the benefits of local markets for users. This
study assesses the performance of distributed and centralised
trading mechanisms, comparing scenarios where the objective
of the exchange may be based on individual or social welfare.
Simulation results show the advantages of local markets and
demonstrate the importance of advancing the understanding of
local markets.
Index Terms—Distributed energy resources, distribution grid,
double auction, local market, smart grids.
NOMENCLATURE
k Time-slot
K Set of time-slots k
xj,PVk PV generation at time k, user j
xj,Battk Energy stored at time k, user j
J Set of users j
B Set of buyers b
S Set of sellers s
P Set of prices p
pb Offer price of buyer b
ps Bid price of seller s
Q Set of quantities of energy q
qb Quantity of energy to purchase by buyer b
qs Quantity of energy to supply by seller s
td Trading time
ID Set of identification index id
OB Set of all orders in the order book
Moδ Market order with index δ
pt Transaction price
qt Quantity of energy to exchange
QT Total of energy traded
U Utility function
C Cost function
Lmin Minimum value of trading prices
Lmax Maximum value of trading prices
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing penetration of renewable electricity generation
and energy storage technology characterise the future of elec-
trical power systems. All these developments along with an
advanced network communication constitute one part of the
smart grid vision. Undoubtedly, these technologies will bring
more active participation of end users. As a consequence, the
network will confront changes in its structure as well as in the
business model.
Australia is one of the leaders in PV installation around the
world. Around 900,000 rooftop PV systems were installed in
Australia between 2010 and 2012 [1]. The expansion of PV is
increasing as a result of some factors such as the rising rates
of electricity, subsidies and advances in technologies, which
are bringing more profitable solutions for users. However,
incentives remain under the expectations of customers. For
example, one of the most common production subsidies for
energy users is feed-in-tariff, in which households will receive
payments for the power exported to the grid. Nevertheless,
this subside may not cover the revenue desired to recover
the initial investment and the cost associated with energy
generation. Users with PV systems and battery storages may
take advantage of their surplus of energy, optimising their
energy consumption. Hence, users in a smart grid would be
willing to seek more profitable alternatives to the current
business model and to participate in a more efficient model.
A clear example of innovation in this area is the pilot project
named deX (decentralised energy exchange), which is funded
by the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) and
led by GreenSync [2]. The aim of that project is an online
exchange platform for buying and selling grid-services such as
power from distributed energy resources. This scenario brings
benefits for consumers through reduced electricity network
bills. Furthermore, technological developments have brought
more tools to facilitate the implementation of these models.
For instance, recently some studies have considered using
blockchain technology and smart contracts in electricity mar-
kets [3], [4]. A platform based on blockchain may be used to
enhance the security of transactions, through a virtual currency,
in a local energy market. Despite new enabling technologies,
their complete deployment is not clear yet. Therefore, many
emerging scenarios and uncertainties remain unsolved.
In the context of a local low-voltage network with a small
group of electricity users, the vision of a local trading market
could be established as one alternative to the current business
models. In [5], an overview of distributed energy trading in
smart grid is presented. That survey explores the existing
literature of trading algorithms involved in market frameworks
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such as distributed, centralised and simulation-based solutions.
Likewise, the application and features of a local electricity
market have been identified in [6]. In fact, these studies have
shown that consumers and prosumers may perform a local
market in order to obtain profitable benefits which depend
on factors such as load profiles, energy surplus and fair
prices. Within this context, previous research has explored the
opportunity of trading in micro-grid networks. For example, in
[7], the case of energy trading among isolated micro-grids have
been addressed. To this end, the authors consider centralised as
well as distributed approaches as minimisation cost problem.
Similarly, in [8], welfare maximisation problem is described
to deal with energy trading among micro-grids. While these
studies focussed on interaction between networks, a direct
participation of low-voltage network users in a local market
may also be established.
In this paper, we consider that the units to be traded are
the result of a surplus of energy generated and/or stored. As
discussed in [9], [10], numerous approaches for energy trading
have been introduced considering different types for price
discovery process. Independently whether the structure in the
market is centralised or not, it has been demonstrated that a
scenario of prosumers with a surplus of energy and consumers
in a local market is viable and reaches high levels of efficiency.
In the case of distributed context, via a double auction, the
prices may be determined as a consequence of offers submitted
continuously by agents. Through this mechanism, all agents
may achieve some benefits even though they do not have a
specific bidding strategy. Similarly, other works have shown
the savings achieved by energy trading with a game theoretic
approaches [11], [12]. These studies encourage the use of
bidding mechanisms for this context.
Given these insights, the overall contribution of this paper
is an analysis of energy trading in a local market, where
prosumers and consumers are able to offer and to purchase en-
ergy. This paper seeks partially to bridge energy management
system and bidding mechanism in a local market. Firstly, users
minimize the cost of self-consumption, and subsequently they
identified their amounts and times to trade. Specifically, we
considered centralised and distributed approaches as electricity
market mechanism. The last one is based on the continuous
double auction, which has been defined as high efficient
method by previous studies [13]. Moreover, we consider
centralised and distributed approaches in order to compare the
benefits of each scheme. In doing so, we illustrate the prices
and the amounts of energy exchanged among agents in the
market.
This paper progresses as follows: The next section of
the paper states the system model. This is followed by the
description of the implementation in Section III. Then, Section
IV presents simulations results and the discussion. Finally,
Section V concludes.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Our study is focused on a low-voltage network with dis-
tributed energy resources (DER), as shown in Fig 1. While one
part of the households (prosumers) have PV systems, battery
storage and home energy management systems (HEMS); the
other group is constituted by traditional customers willing to
pay rates defined by the grid operator.
There are three components in our model. The first one is
the local power network, the second one is the customers and
the last one is the market for energy trading.
Fig. 1. Users in a low-voltage network
A. Local Power Network Model
We consider a smart grid system for energy trading at local
level. In order to minimize the energy costs associated to the
use of energy, prosumers in the network have PV systems,
battery storage and HEMS. Let J denotes the set of all j
users in the local grid. The time is divided into time slots
k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, where K is the total number of time slots.
We define xjk as the amount of energy used by the user j ∈ J
in time slot k. There are two categories of users in power
systems, consumers and prosumers. The model of the users
is based on CREST model [14], , which is a high-resolution
stochastic model of electricity demand. This model simulates
electrical demand and generation due to appliances, lighting
and photovoltaics systems. The first objective of the prosumers
in J is to optimise their self-consumption considering their
demand and the energy generated through the PV system
xj,PVk , and the energy stored in the battery x
j,Batt
k . Therefore,
the optimisation problem of a HEMS is given by:
min
X
K∑
k=1
(s+k x
+
k − s−k x−k )
s.t. satisfies storage device, comfort, power flow
and energy balance constraints,
∀k ∈ {1...K}
(1)
where, x+k and x
−
k are the amount of energy flowing from the
grid and to the grid respectively. State variables in the model
are s+k and s
−
k . The former is associated with the price of
energy in time slot k, and the latter with the incentive received
for the contribution to the grid. In other words, s+k and s
−
k may
be related to rates (e.g. flat, time-of-use) or incentives (e.g.
feed-in-tariff). The outcome of the previous process provides
net load profiles for users with HEMS. Given the prosumers
have an excess of energy after their self-optimisation, a local
market for energy trading may be established.
B. Energy Trading Model
The effectiveness and performance of the market depends
on the mechanisms implemented. In our study, we have
considered distributed and centralised schemes.
1) Distributed Market: The operation of the market in this
case involves only two parties interested in the trading. Hence
it is peer-to-peer (P2P) and bilateral contract between agents
(buyers and sellers). In order to achieve an individual welfare,
the agents submit offers/bids based on their preferences and
costs. The local market is based on a continuous doubled
auction (CDA), where there are a set of buyers, b ∈ B,
and sellers, s ∈ S , willing to participate continuously in
the market considering their trading prices (pb, ps) and their
amount of energy to purchase or supply (qb, qs) (See Fig 2).
Previous studies have shown that market efficiency may be
directly attributed to continuous double auctions [13]. This
auction mechanism is widely used in stock markets around the
world. Some examples are the NASDAQ, the New York Stock
Exchange and online markets such as the auctions conducted
by eBay. In a CDA, the agents offer or bid during a trading
time td and their offers and bids are registered in a order
book OB(id, p, q, t), where each order has an index id ∈ ID,
price p ∈ P , quantity q ∈ Q and the time when the order
was received t ∈ T . During the trading time, the process of
arrivals in the order book follow a Poisson process with a mean
λ. Additionally, this model is a multi-unit market where units
exchanged symbolize the flowing of power between agents,
which is their main motivation to participate in the market.
Fig. 2. Prosumers and Consumers submit continually their offers and bids.
Let define Moδ ∈ OB as the market order with index
δ ∈ ∆. An order is a market order if this one had a match
during the trading time td. Once the market is closed, the
outcome of the trading is a set of market orders Moδ with
a transaction price pδt and quantity q
δ
t .For the matching
process, there are two fundamental properties in offers/bids to
be considered. The first one is the price, and the second one
is the time in which the offer/bid was recorded in the order
book. Hence, the best offer (buyers) is the earliest offer with
the highest price. Likewise, in the case of bids (sellers), the
best one is the earliest bid with the lowest price. To determine
whether a transaction is completed or not, the best bid and the
best offer are compared. If pb ≥ ps, the orders are matching
and the agents will exchange energy. Otherwise, it will remain
in the order book. If a new offer/bid is not better than the
best one, it will be aggregated to the order book regarding its
arrival time and price. This process is executed several times
in the order book during the trading period. After the matching
process, an order can have covered their request partially . If
this is the case, it will remain at the top of the order book
waiting for a new order.
Once the trading time has elapsed, the total of energy QT
is given by:
QT =
∑
δ∈∆
qδt (2)
Conventionally, the participants of markets, buyers and
sellers, define their offers and bids based on their preferences
and costs associated. Since our interest is to assess the benefits
of a local market, in our study the agents are zero intelligence
plus (ZIP) traders. In [15], Gode and Sunder designed zero
intelligence traders. Buyers and sellers submit randomly their
offers or bids depending on their constraints (Lmax and Lmin
are the maximum and minimum price respectively). In order
to improve the performance of zero intelligence traders, Cliff
and Bruten [16] developed ZIP traders. Agents have a profit
margin which determines the difference between their limit
prices and their offers or bids. Under this strategy, traders adapt
and update their margins base on the matching of previous
orders. The algorithm 1 shows an overview of the order book
process with ZIP traders.
2) Centralised Market: In this structure, the optimal dis-
patch is decided based on all information of consumers and
prosumers. In order maximize the global welfare, the agents
will develop an energy allocation algorithm to identify the
market equilibrium in each trading period. Commonly, the
social welfare is formulated through the utility and cost func-
tions. Each consumer has a utility function U(qb) that models
the level of satisfaction due to purchase energy. Likewise,
each prosumer has a cost function C(qs) that represents the
costs associated to the amount generated. Regarding the social
welfare problem must ensure power balance, the maximisation
of social welfare takes the form:
max
qb,qs
∑
t∈T
U(qtb)− C(qts)
s.t. units constraints and load balance
constraints
(3)
While the dispatch is decided through optimal allocation, the
methodology for pricing depends on the mechanism to define
one market clearing price (MCP). The value of this variable
represents the price of each unit to be exchanged. Generally,
MCP is equal to the equilibrium price, the intersection of
supply and demand curves. As a result of this process, all
bids with ps ≤MCP , as well as all offers with pb ≥MCP
are accepted. Consequently, consumers and prosumers are
informed of the amount to be traded.
Although this mechanism leads to a balance in the market
between agents, different methods have been developed to
bring other properties to the markets. In particular, Vickery-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism is incentive compatible for
optimising the social welfare through efficient allocation where
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for the ZIP traders
1: procedure ORDER BOOK(OB)
2: initialization;
3: while market is open do
4: randomly select a new trader
5: new order by ZIP-trader
6: if buyer then
7: new OB(idb, pb, qb, t)
8: else
9: new OB(ids, ps, qs, t)
10: end if
11: allocation of new order in OB
12: evaluate matching process
13: . Update values of profit margins ———- Buyers
14: if the last order was matched at price qt then
15: all buyers for which pb ≥ qt, raise his margin;
16: if the last trader was a seller then
17: any active buyer for which pb ≤ qt,
18: lower his margin;
19: end if
20: else
21: if the last trader was a buyer then
22: any active buyer for which pb ≤ qt,
23: lower his margin;
24: end if
25: end if
26: . Update values of profit margins ———- Sellers
27: if the last order was matched at price qt then
28: all sellers for which ps ≤ qt, raise his margin;
29: if the last trader was a buyer then
30: any active seller for which pb ≥ qt,
31: lower his margin;
32: end if
33: else
34: if the last trader was a seller then
35: any active seller for which pb ≥ qt,
36: lower his margin;
37: end if
38: end if
39: end while
40: end procedure
each agent pays an amount equal to the social cost/damage
that he causes the other players [17]. Hence, truthfulness is a
dominant strategy in this mechanism. In order to compare two
approaches in this centralised market, we will evaluate these
mechanisms in the formulated scenario.
As this is a preliminary study, we do not yet consider
network losses or constraints, in effect assuming a copper-
plate network model. A full network representation will be
integrated into the trading mechanism as part of future work.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
The proposed market consists of a group of dwellings, com-
prising a mix of consumers and prosumers, a market structure
determining prices and matching of trades, a copper-plate
network facilitating transport of energy, and a communica-
tions network enabling the flow of market-related information.
Demand profiles, with k = 1 minute resolution, are based
on CREST Demand Model [14]. In Fig 3 are depicted the
time-of-use tariff (ToU) and feed-in-tariff (FiT) used in our
model. Since ZIP traders improved their performance when
the maximum and minimum constraints are defined, we use
the values of tariff through the day to define Lmax and Lmin.
Hence, the former depends on the ToU tariff and the latter on
FiT. These definitions are consistent in the sense that no buyer
would pay more than the tariff of the retailer (ToU) and no
sellers would sell their units cheaper than the incentive (FiT)
that they would expect to receive. In summary, the process of
our model is:
• Prosumers run HEMS to minimize their cost based
on the optimisation problem (1) formulated previ-
ously. To solve the problem, we used Mixed-integer
Linear Program (MILP).
• Prosumers state the time-slots when they have extra
energy to trade.
• The input data for the market include load profiles
of prosumers and consumers, and the value of the
tariff.
• Local market is performed and Order Book starts to
receive orders during trading periods.
• Agents accept the amount of units to be exchanged
and their prices.
Additionally, two scenarios were evaluated. In the first one,
the energy to trade is a consequence of extra energy generated
by PV systems. In the second, prosumers are willing to trade
their surplus of energy generated as well as stored in their
batteries. More specifications and results are explained in the
next section.
Fig. 3. Time-of-use tariff (ToU) and feed-in-tariff (FiT)
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
For simulating the proposed system, we regarded load
profiles from CREST Model of 100 dwellings, of which 37 are
prosumers and 63 are consumers. Preceded by HEMS process,
prosumers identified their surplus, and therefore quantities to
trade in the market.
A. Scenario 1
In this case, the best time for participating in the market is
around middle day as a consequence of extra units generated
by PV systems. Moreover, users with HEMS meet their
demand and store energy in their battery to use at peak time
prices. For this reason, in our case-study, the most productive
periods to trade were established between 8 am and 3 pm. As
it was mentioned before, the market was performed consid-
ering three mechanisms: Centralised with equilibrium price,
centralised with VCG mechanism and distributed P2P market.
To compare the prices of transactions in each mechanism, we
calculated the average transaction price 〈Tp〉 during the day.
Fig. 4. Average transaction prices 〈Tp〉 in scenario 1
Fig 4 shows the average transaction price each hour. The
trend of all prices is to remain in the range of Lmin and Lmax
(i.e. values of ToU and FiT). Hence, both buyers and sellers
obtain a benefit from the local market. In the context of P2P
case, there are no large fluctuations during each trading period.
This is due to the strategy used by ZIP traders, agents learned
during trading and modified their margins to participate in
the market. The transactions prices converge rapidly result
in no significant variations. The number of traders and the
units to trade are different each trading period. Therefore, the
transaction price does not necessarily have to converge to the
same value. There is a peak at 2 pm because of the change
in the tariff at that time. Additionally, we can conclude that
VCG mechanism brings slightly lower prices in a centralised
case. However, the cause of this is potentially associated with
one feature of VCG mechanism which is budget deficit. In
this case, sellers accepted prices in benefit of buyers. Those
prices tend to be less than the equilibrium price.
In the Fig 5, the total energy traded QT each hour is
presented. In the first hours, the amount traded is small and
increases gradually to reach a peak around middle day. Finally,
it decreases progressively over time. Furthermore, the quantity
exchanged with P2P mechanism is slightly less during the
whole day. This is caused by factors associated with the
auction process and agents strategies such as arrival orders
time, margin prices and the evolution of the learning process
by ZIP traders. In the case of centralised options, the units are
the same because they use the same method for the allocation.
The Table I shows savings and profits (in dollars) that
consumers and prosumers would have potentially with their
participation in the local market during one day. Additionally,
the table compares values to show the profitable of each
mechanism. Savings indicates the money that buyers are
Fig. 5. Total energy traded QT in scenario 1
economising due to buying in the local market instead of the
grid operator. Similarly, profit represents the extra money that
sellers would earn.
TABLE I
SCENARIO 1. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT MECHANISMS IN THE
LOCAL MARKET. THESE VALUES REPRESENT THE REVENUES FOR AGENTS
Time
(Hr)
Centralised VCG P2P
Savings Profit Savings Profit Savings Profit
8 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01
9 0.10 0.34 0.12 0.32 0.06 0.29
10 0.61 0.42 0.65 0.39 0.14 0.64
11 1.42 0.21 1.46 0.18 0.45 0.67
12 1.15 0.35 1.18 0.33 0.57 0.39
13 0.74 0.47 0.76 0.46 0.64 0.30
14 0.11 0.34 0.17 0.30 0.10 0.36
15 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.27
Total 4.19 2.39 4.37 2.21 1.98 2.93
From the Table I, we can see that there are benefits for
all agents in the market regardless of the mechanism used.
For the buyers, centralised mechanisms were more profitable,
particularly with VCG mechanism. In the case of the sellers,
they achieved more profit from a distributed mechanism. Even
although with the centralised mechanism the amount of energy
was greater than in the distributed mechanism, the payoff may
be higher because of the transaction price.
B. Scenario 2
In this case, prosumers are willing to keep some energy in
the battery to trade instead of using the whole surplus only
for their self-consumption. Consequently, there will be others
trading times throughout the day. Results of this scenario are
shown in figures 6 and 7.
An increasing of hours for trading is evident. Similar to the
previous scenario, there are no significant changes during each
trading periods, and the prices respond to each mechanism
and agents strategies. Likewise, the change in the value of
the tariff causes high variation in prices around 2 pm. The
total of energy traded in this scenario is substantially more.
Meanwhile, in the first scenario there was no energy to trade
after 3 pm; in this case, the time to trade was extended until
7 pm. Therefore, sellers have the opportunity to trade during
more time and buyers may avoid peak prices from the grid
Fig. 6. Average transaction prices 〈Tp〉 in scenario 2
Fig. 7. Total energy traded QT in scenario 2
operator. After the peak time, sellers may start to charge their
batteries again at better prices (shoulder and off-peak periods).
As shown in Table II, the more profitable method, for both
sellers and buyers, are the centralised mechanisms. However,
there were some time periods when the P2P mechanism was
better for sellers (from 11 am to 3 pm).
TABLE II
SCENARIO 2. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT MECHANISMS IN THE
LOCAL MARKET. THESE VALUES REPRESENT THE REVENUES FOR AGENTS
Time
(Hr)
Centralised VCG P2P
Savings Profit Savings Profit Savings Profit
7 0.38 0.43 0.40 0.42 0.24 0.20
8 0.44 0.40 0.45 0.39 0.34 0.29
9 0.47 0.39 0.48 0.38 0.39 0.33
10 0.69 0.32 0.71 0.31 0.39 0.32
11 1.49 0.16 1.50 0.15 0.69 0.44
12 1.27 0.23 1.29 0.21 0.68 0.30
13 1.20 0.24 1.21 0.23 0.61 0.23
14 4.32 1.04 4.38 0.98 1.78 1.63
15 3.28 1.36 3.42 1.22 1.94 1.42
16 2.47 1.60 2.49 1.58 1.67 1.12
17 2.40 1.56 2.41 1.54 1.68 1.04
18 2.35 1.53 2.36 1.52 1.58 1.01
19 2.44 1.58 2.46 1.56 1.59 1.04
Total 23.22 10.83 23.57 10.49 13.57 9.40
Both scenarios have shown profitable results for traders.
Regardless of the mechanism used, consumers and prosumers
have a great opportunity to achieve revenues if they perform
and participate in a local market.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have assessed the performance and prof-
itable of a local market. This has been formulated considering
centralised and distributed mechanism in a continues double
auction. Units traded represent the energy surplus of a group
of users with PV systems, battery storage and HEMS. Our
simulations and results have shown the benefits that the local
market will bring to their participants independently of the
mechanism implemented. For future work, it is of interest to
extend the study of strategies of agents with a more extensive
analysis including penalties and technical constraints in the
network.
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